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Essays on Power in Labor Markets
Anna Stansbury
Workers’ pay and working conditions can be determined 
not just by the productivity of their labor, but also by power 
and institutions. In my dissertation, I examine three aspects 
of power and institutions in the U.S. and U.K. labor markets: 
1) the wage effects of employer concentration and worker 
outside options in the United States, 2) the decline of worker 
power and its macroeconomic implications in the United 
States, and 3) minimum wage compliance and enforcement 
in the United States and United Kingdom. Overall, the three 
essays underscore the importance of labor market power 
and institutions in the determination of wages—particularly 
for low- and middle-income workers. In this summary, I 
describe each essay in more detail and conclude with a 
discussion of the policy implications.
Essay 1
Employer Concentration and Outside Options
(with Gregor Schubert and Bledi Taska)
In recent years, concerns about employer concentration 
have increased. It has been posited as a possible cause of 
inequality, low pay, and stagnant pay growth. Antitrust 
authorities have been called on to consider employer 
concentration in merger and acquisition review, and to 
investigate whether it facilitates restrictions on competition, 
such as no-poaching agreements. And, since it can be a 
source of monopsony power (Berger, Herkenhoff, and 
Mongey 2019; Jarosch, Nimczik, and Sorkin 2019), concerns 
around high employer concentration have bolstered calls to 
raise minimum wages and strengthen collective bargaining.1
In the first essay, we seek to answer the following 
question: To what extent does employer concentration matter 
for U.S. workers’ wages, and for whom does it matter the 
most? We estimate the effects of employer concentration on 
average hourly wages across over 100,000 U.S. SOC six-
digit occupation-by-metropolitan-area labor markets over the 
years 2013–2016, following Azar et al. (2020a) in measuring 
employer concentration with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) constructed from Burning Glass Technologies’ online 
job postings database. 
Our strategy addresses two common empirical issues, 
the first of which is endogeneity. While recent research 
has documented a negative relationship between local 
employer concentration and wages (e.g., Azar et al., 2020a,b; 
Hershbein, Macaluso, and Chen Yeh 2019; Benmelech, 
Bergman, and Kim 2018; Rinz 2018), the extent to which 
this causal is unclear: employer concentration may be 
correlated with other local economic conditions, which affect 
wages. To respond to this, we propose a new identification 
approach for the effects of employer concentration on 
wages, drawing on shift-share and granular instrumental 
variables methodology (Borusyak, Hull, and Jaravel 2018; 
Gabaix and Koijen 2020). We instrument for employer 
concentration within a particular local occupation with the 
predicted change in employer concentration, predicting 
each local employer’s hiring with its national hiring in that 
occupation. This enables us to construct shocks to local 
employer concentration that are plausibly orthogonal to local 
productivity, with the key identifying assumption being that 
each large firm’s decision to increase or decrease its hiring 
nationwide is exogenous with respect to the local economic 
conditions in any specific local occupation.
The second empirical issue is market definition. Assessing 
the effect of local employer concentration on wages, and 
pinpointing the workers who are most affected by it, requires 
a good definition of the relevant local labor market for 
workers. Using new, highly granular occupational mobility 
data constructed from 16 million U.S. workers’ resumes 
(obtained by Burning Glass Technologies),2 we show that 
occupational mobility is high and highly heterogeneous 
across occupations. This suggests that regressing wages 
on within-occupation employer concentration—as 
much recent research does—without considering the 
availability of these outside occupation job options (a) may 
obscure heterogeneity, as some occupations are a better 
approximation of workers’ true labor market than others, 
and (b) may lead to biased estimates, as workers who are 
in high-concentration labor markets (within their local 
occupation) also tend to have poor local job options outside 
their occupation.
To respond to this, we introduce two new factors into 
our baseline regressions of wages on within-occupation 
employer concentration. First, we allow the estimated 
coefficient on within-occupation employer concentration 
to vary by occupations’ outward mobility, allowing us to 
estimate different effects of employer concentration on 
wages for low-mobility vs. high-mobility occupations (for 
whom the SOC six-digit occupation is less likely to be a 
good approximation to their true labor market).3 Second, 
we develop a measure of the value of workers’ outside 
job options in other occupations—an “outside-occupation 
option index”—and estimate its effect on wages alongside 
the effect of within-occupation employer concentration. Our 
outside-occupation option index is the weighted average 
of local wages in all occupations except the worker’s own, 
with each weight the product of (a) occupational mobility 
flows to each outside occupation and (b) the local relative 
employment share in each outside occupation (building on 
work on spillover effects of local outside job options by 
Beaudry, Green, and Sand [2012]; Caldwell and Danieli 
[2018]; and Macaluso [2019], among others). We use a shift-
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share instrumental variables approach to identify effects of 
changes in this outside-occupation option index on wages, 
instrumenting for local occupational wages with the leave-
one-out national mean wage in outside option occupations.
How much does employer concentration matter for 
wages? Our baseline results suggest that while most workers 
are not in highly concentrated labor markets, moving from 
the median to the 95th percentile HHI (as faced by workers) 
results in 2.6 log points lower wages.4 This average masks 
substantial heterogeneity: within-occupation employer 
concentration matters substantially more for workers who are 
less able to find comparably good jobs in other occupations. 
For occupations in the lowest quartile of occupational 
mobility, like registered nurses and security guards, moving 
from the median to 95th percentile HHI is associated with 
between 4 and 8 log points lower wages; for occupations in 
the highest quartile of occupational mobility, like counter 
attendants or bank tellers, our point estimate is zero, and the 
confidence interval rules out any decrease in wages greater 
than 1.8 log points. A back-of-the-envelope calculation, 
using our coefficient estimates, suggests that over 10 percent 
of the 110 million workers covered by our data experience 
wage suppression of 2 percent or more as a result of 
employer concentration. Many of the most-affected workers 
are health care workers, reflecting both high health care 
employment concentration and low occupational mobility.
We also find a positive and significant effect of an 
increase in the value of outside-occupation options, holding 
constant within-occupation employer concentration: for 
the median occupation, moving from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile value of outside-occupation options across 
cities is associated with 3.7 log points higher wages.5 This 
is economically meaningful: for the median occupation, 
moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile city by average 
wage is associated with a 21 log points higher wage.
Overall, our findings point to a middle ground between 
two prominent views about the effects of employer 
concentration in the U.S. labor market: employer 
concentration is neither a niche issue confined to a few 
factory towns, nor does it seem prevalent enough to affect 
average wages or inequality to a large degree. The fact that 
employer concentration affects wages for several million 
Americans, however, suggests that increased policy attention 
to this issue is appropriate—perhaps in terms of antitrust, 
policies to raise wages, and policies to increase worker 
mobility. For these policy decisions, our work underscores 
that the definition of the labor market is vitally important.
Essay 2
The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis
(with Lawrence H. Summers)
Since the early 1980s in the United States, the share of 
income going to labor has fallen, measures of corporate 
valuations like Tobin’s Q have risen, average profitability 
has risen even as interest rates have declined, and measured 
markups have risen. Over the same time period, average 
unemployment has fallen substantially even as inflation has 
stayed low, suggesting a decline in the NAIRU. In the second 
essay, we argue that the decline in worker power has been 
the major structural change responsible for these economic 
phenomena.
How could this be the case? Consider an economy 
characterized by three types of power, to varying degrees: 
monopoly power, monopsony power, and worker power.6 
Firms’ monopoly power generates pure profits or rents, and 
worker power gives workers an ability to share in these 
rents. A decline in worker power can therefore lead to a 
redistribution of rents from labor to capital owners. This in 
turn can be expected to lead to a decline in the labor share of 
income and a rise in corporate profitability and valuations. At 
the same time, under this framework (and most other models 
of worker power), a fall in worker power would predict a fall 
in the NAIRU, as the decline in the cost of labor increases 
firms’ hiring, and/or as “wait unemployment” falls (see, e.g., 
Mortensen and Pissarides 1999 and Figura and Ratner 2015).
The above logic makes clear that it is possible that 
declining worker power could account for the macro trends 
we have seen. The goal of our paper is to address whether 
this is empirically plausible. We make our case in four parts. 
First, we assemble evidence of the large decline in worker 
power in the United States over the past four decades. 
Second, we attempt to quantify the decline in worker 
power as manifested in a decline in labor rents and show 
that it was economically meaningful. Third, we show that 
aggregate, industry-level, and state-level changes in labor 
rents are consistent with changes in labor shares, corporate 
profitability and valuations, and unemployment. Fourth, we 
illustrate that falling worker power is at least as consistent—
if not more so—with the data than other explanations that 
focus only on rising monopoly power, globalization, or 
technological change.
The Decline in Worker Power 
In the early postwar decades, there was substantial 
evidence of rent sharing in U.S. labor markets: unionized 
workers; nonunion workers in large firms or in certain 
high-wage industries (like manufacturing, mining, 
telecommunications, and utilities); and workers in 
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industries with high productivity, profits, or product market 
concentration all tended to receive pay premia relative 
to observably equivalent workers without each of these 
characteristics (e.g., Freeman and Medoff 1984; Brown 
and Medoff 1989; Katz and Summers 1989). But each of 
these indicators of labor market rent sharing has weakened 
substantially over recent decades. The private sector union 
membership rate declined from over one-third at its peak 
in the 1950s to 6 percent today (Rosenfeld 2014). Since 
the 1980s the large firm wage premium has fallen by about 
a third (Hollister 2004; Song et al. 2019), and we find a 
decline of about one-third in the dispersion of industry wage 
premia (as calculated from the Current Population Survey). 
In manufacturing, we find that higher revenue productivity 
is less likely to translate into higher pay than it was in 
the 1960s; Bell et al. (2019) find a similar result for the 
profitability-pay relationship. We also find some evidence 
of a weakening in the relationship between industrial 
concentration and pay across sectors.7
Quantifying the Decline in Labor Rents 
How big was the decline of worker power in 
macroeconomic terms? We use estimates of the union wage 
premium, large firm wage premium, and industry wage 
premia from the Current Population Survey to quantify the 
magnitude of the decline in total rents going to labor over 
1982–2016. We estimate that labor rents declined from 12 
percent of net value added in the nonfinancial corporate 
business sector in the early 1980s to 6 percent in the 2010s. 
Decompositions suggest this decline was largely due to 
changes within industries, rather than across industries (as 
employment shifted from manufacturing to services). The 
decline in labor rents appears in large part to have been 
a result of a redistribution of rents from labor to capital 
owners, rather than a destruction of rents overall (as a result 
of, e.g., rising product market competition).8 
Labor Shares, Corporate Profitability, and Valuations
Was the pattern of the decline of labor rents consistent 
with the macro trends we seek to explain? For the labor 
share, we show that our estimate of the decline in labor rents 
is big enough to explain the entire decline in the net labor 
share in the nonfinancial corporate sector. At the state and 
NAICS three-digit industry level, our measure of the decline 
in the labor rent share is also strongly predictive of changes 
in the labor share over 1984–2016.
For corporate profitability and valuations, Greenwald et 
al. (2019) estimate that the decline in the labor share explains 
43 percent of the increase in U.S. equity values since 1989. 
If falling worker power can indeed explain the decline in 
the labor share, this suggests that falling worker power 
can also explain much of the increase in equity valuations. 
In addition, we show that industries with larger declines 
in labor rents tended to have larger increases in average 
profitability and in valuations as measured by Tobin’s Q.
Finally, for unemployment, we show that states and 
industries with bigger falls in labor rents over recent decades 
saw bigger falls in their average unemployment rate. 
Extrapolation from our coefficient estimates suggests that 
the aggregate fall in worker power could be big enough to 
explain a large share of the decline in the NAIRU.
Worker Power vs. Other Hypotheses
Prominent recent explanations for the fall in the 
labor share and concurrent rise in corporate valuations 
have posited a rise in product market monopoly power 
(Barkai, forthcoming; Gutiérrez and Philippon 2017, 2019; 
Eggertsson et al. 2018; Farhi and Gourio 2018; Loecker 
et al. 2020). Yet, replicating Farhi and Gourio’s (2018) 
decomposition exercise, we illustrate that a decline in rent 
sharing with labor (falling worker power) is just as consistent 
with these macro- financial trends as a rise in monopoly 
power. Moreover, we show that changes in labor rents at the 
industry level have substantially more explanatory power 
than changes in product market concentration for changes 
in labor shares, profitability, and Q. Indeed, manufacturing 
industries have seen some of the biggest falls in labor shares 
but minimal increases in (import-adjusted) product market 
concentration. Other explanations for the fall in the labor 
share focus on globalization and/or technological change 
(see, e.g., Elsby et al. 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman 
2014; Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018; Autor et al. 2020). 
But any explanation grounded in perfect competition is 
unable to account for the rise in measured markups and 
corporate valuations (Eggertsson et al. 2018). Moreover, 
the decline in the labor share has been much more 
pronounced in the United States than other economies 
similarly exposed to globalization and technological change. 
Finally, globalization, technological change, and monopoly 
power each fail to offer an explanation for the large fall 
in the NAIRU. Taken together, these suggest to us that 
globalization, technological change, or rising monopoly 
power alone lack the ability to explain recent economic 
developments in a unified way.
Overall, we conclude that the decline in worker power 
is one of the most important structural changes to have 
taken place in the U.S. economy in recent decades, in terms 
of its macroeconomic impact. Our focus on the decline in 
worker power is in line with a long history of progressive 
institutionalist work in the social sciences, exemplified 
by Freeman and Medoff (1984), Levy and Temin (2007), 
Bivens et al. (2018), Kristal (2010), Rosenfeld (2014), and 
Ahlquist (2017). Our results suggest that, if seeking to 
reverse the decline in the labor share, approaches that focus 
on perfecting product or labor market competition may not 
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be sufficient. Instead, institutional changes that enhance 
workers’ countervailing power may be necessary (but would 
need to be carefully considered in light of the possible risks 
of increasing unemployment).
Essay 3
Incentives to Comply with the Minimum Wage 
in the United States and United Kingdom
(U.K. section cowritten with Lindsay Judge)
The minimum wage is a core protection for workers in 
both the United States and the United Kingdom. But it is 
only effective to the extent that it is complied with. In the 
third essay, partly cowritten with Lindsay Judge, I ask the 
question, “What incentive do firms have to comply with 
the minimum wage in the United States and the United 
Kingdom?” Assuming a profit-maximizing firm has an 
incentive to comply if the expected costs of noncompliance 
exceed the extra profits that can be earned through 
noncompliance (as in Becker, 1968; Ashenfelter and Smith 
1979), I estimate firms’ incentives to comply with federal 
minimum wage and overtime law in the United States (as 
per the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA] 1938), and with the 
minimum wage in the United Kingdom (as per the National 
Minimum Wage Act 1998).9,10
Compliance Incentives in the United States
 In the United States, while minimum wage and overtime 
violations can in theory incur large penalties under the 
FLSA, in practice, the available evidence suggests that most 
violating firms pay relatively little. All (detected) violators 
must pay back wages owed to workers. Violators may also 
be required to pay up to an equal amount in liquidated 
damages, but while this often occurs in court actions, this 
appears to occur only rarely in Department of Labor (DOL) 
investigations. Repeat and/or willful violators may also be 
required to pay civil monetary penalties, but analysis of the 
DOL’s compliance and enforcement database (containing 
all investigations over 2005–2020) shows that only 11 
percent of detected FLSA violations are deemed repeat and/
or willful, that nearly half of these are not required to pay 
any civil monetary penalty, and that typical penalties (when 
levied) are relatively small: for eligible violators, the median 
penalty is around 30 cents per dollar of back wages owed. 
Finally, criminal prosecution is rare: there were 10 criminal 
convictions for FLSA underpayment during 2005–2016—a 
period during which the DOL identified nearly 3,000 willful 
FLSA minimum wage and/or overtime underpayments.
What does this mean for compliance incentives? Given 
these relatively small costs of breaking the law, typical 
firms would have to expect extremely high probabilities 
of detection to have a financial incentive to comply. For 
example, the typical first-time violator detected by the DOL 
would have to expect a probability of detection of at least 
88 percent, and even the most egregious first-time violators 
would have to expect a probability of detection of at least 
one in three. Higher penalties are levied on repeat violators, 
but even then, the typical repeat violator detected by the 
DOL would have to expect a probability of detection of at 
least 78 percent to have an incentive to comply. The actual 
probability of detection is likely much lower than this for 
many firms. Given limited resources, even in high-risk 
sectors the probability of a firm receiving a DOL inspection 
in any given year may be as low as 2 percent (Ji and Weil 
2015; Galvin 2016). And while for some firms, the risk of 
worker complaints is enough to incentivize compliance, 
complaints are often unlikely: workers may be unaware they 
are being underpaid, unable to spare the time or resources to 
complain, or unwilling to complain for fear of retaliation or 
involvement with the legal system.
Compliance Incentives in the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, while penalties have increased in 
recent years, our analysis of data from government records 
and freedom of information requests shows that the total 
cost of a minimum wage violation for a typical firm remains 
relatively low. All firms caught underpaying the minimum 
wage must pay arrears (the wages owed) to the affected 
workers. In HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) inspections, 
around 60 percent of firms are also required to pay a penalty 
worth 100 percent of the arrears (with an additional 100 
percent of arrears due if the penalty is not paid promptly); the 
remaining 40 percent are offered the option to “self-correct,” 
meaning that the firm pays no penalty. In employment 
tribunal cases, violating firms may in theory have to pay 
substantial penalties if there are aggravating circumstances, 
but in practice these penalties are almost never levied. And 
while in theory it is possible for firms or individuals to 
be criminally prosecuted and subject to an unlimited fine 
for severe minimum wage violations, there were only 14 
prosecutions between 2007 and 2018 (a period during which 
HMRC identified over 7,000 minimum wage violations), 
with an average fine of £2,695.
What does this mean for compliance incentives? Under 
the HMRC penalty regime, most firms would have to expect 
at least a 50 percent chance of being caught (by HMRC) in 
order to have an incentive to pay their workers the minimum 
wage. While HMRC has substantial inspection resources, 
meaning that for some firms the probability of detection 
may well be 50 percent or higher, a back-of-the-envelope 
exercise using estimates of noncompliance by firm size from 
the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings suggests that for 
the typical firm violating the minimum wage, the probability 
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of detection in a given year is between 3 percent and 13 
percent. And while HMRC is not the only enforcement 
channel—workers can also take a minimum wage complaint 
to an employment tribunal or county court—the fact that 
firms rarely have to pay any penalty in these settings means 
that firms would have to expect near-certain detection for this 
channel to represent a meaningful deterrent.
Overall, the analysis in this paper therefore suggests that 
for many firms in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom, compliance with the minimum wage essentially 
rests on firms’ reputational concerns or managerial goodwill. 
Viewed from this perspective, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that noncompliance with the minimum wage appears to be 
common in both countries, with Galvin (2016) estimating 
that 16.9 percent of low-wage workers in the United States 
experienced a minimum wage violation in 2013, and the 
Low Pay Commission (2019) estimating that 22 percent of 
individuals covered by minimum wage rates were underpaid 
in April 2018. If the minimum wage is to be an effective tool 
for ending low pay—while also ensuring a level playing field 
for law-abiding businesses—compliance and enforcement 
should be a central focus for policymakers.
Summary and Policy Implications
Overall, the three essays in this dissertation underscore 
the importance of labor market power and institutions in 
the determination of wages. If society wishes to raise pay 
for low- and middle-income workers and to reduce income 
inequality, these essays suggest a number of possible policy 
responses.
The first essay finds that employer concentration 
suppresses wages for at least 10 percent of U.S. workers. 
Policy responses could include (a) increased antitrust scrutiny 
of labor markets, particularly of mergers which increase 
local employer concentration for workers in occupations 
with few outside-occupation options; (b) targeted provision 
of countervailing power through wage floors and/or support 
for unions in highly concentrated labor markets; and (c) 
policies to expand workers’ outside option set by reducing 
barriers to occupational and/or geographic mobility 
(such as expanded affordable housing in expensive cities, 
reciprocal state recognition of occupational licensing, or 
removal of unnecessary barriers to occupational licensing or 
certification).
The second essay finds that the decline in worker power 
can account for the decline in the U.S. labor share. Reversing 
this decline may therefore require policies to reverse 
trends in worker power. This could include a strengthening 
of formal worker power through support for unions and 
collective bargaining, increases in incentives for firms 
to maximize a broader conception of stakeholder value 
(including workers) alongside shareholder value, or other 
changes in the legal and policy environment that enable 
workers to share in the profits generated by their firms.
The third essay finds that the low penalties and low 
probabilities of detection give many firms in the United 
States and the United Kingdom limited incentives to 
comply with the minimum wage. The problem of minimum 
wage noncompliance is therefore unsurprising, and may 
only become more acute as minimum wages are set to be 
increased in both the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Increased penalties, alongside increased investigation 
resources, are needed to ensure that most firms have an 
incentive to comply with these core protections.
Notes
 1. Authors making the arguments in this paragraph include, 
variously, Bahn (2018); Shambaugh et al. (2018); Krueger and 
Posner (2018); Naidu, Posner, and Weyl (2018); Marinescu and 
Hovenkamp (2019); Marinescu and Posner (2020).
 2. The large sample size—an order of magnitude more than other 
data sources—enables us to estimate occupational transitions 
reliably between a large share of U.S. occupations. We are 
making this new occupational mobility dataset publicly 
available.
 3. Our use of occupational flows to identify workers’ “revealed” 
labor markets builds on Shaw (1987); Manning and Petrongolo 
(2017); Neffke, Otto, and Weyh (2017); and Nimczik (2018).
 4. Our estimates are consistent with Arnold (2020) and Prager and 
Schmitt’s (2019) estimates of the effect of changes in employer 
concentration as a result of merger and acquisition activity.
 5. We also find coefficient estimates of the effect of within-
occupation employer HHI on wages are biased upward by 
around 30–40 percent if outside-occupation options are not 
included in the analysis.
 6. Monopoly power may arise from barriers to entry or from 
innate features of particular product markets, such as 
heterogeneous production technologies or short-run fixed 
costs. Labor market monopsony power may arise from 
employer concentration and/or frictions, and results in an 
upward sloping labor supply curve to the firm, enabling a wage 
below the marginal revenue product. Worker power—arising 
from unionization or the threat of unionization, firms being 
run partly in the interests of workers, and/or efficiency wage 
effects—enables workers to increase their pay above the level 
that would prevail in the absence of such power.
 7. The decline in worker power was likely a result of three broad 
shifts: 1) institutional changes, as the policy environment 
became less supportive of unions and the minimum wage fell 
in real terms (see, e.g., Rosenfeld 2014); 2) changes within 
firms, as increased shareholder power created pressure to cut 
labor costs, leading to wage reductions and the “fissuring” of 
the workplace (see, e.g., Weil 2014); and 3) changing economic 
conditions, as labor faced increased competition from 
technology and from low-wage countries (see, e.g., Levy and 
Temin 2007).
 8. Specifically: the majority of industries that saw substantial 
declines in rents to labor also saw substantial increases in 
profits to capital over 1987–2016, and in manufacturing—
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the sector with the biggest decline in the labor share—the 
industries with the greatest exposure to low-wage import 
competition were not the industries with the biggest declines in 
labor rents.
 9. This conceptual framework has also been applied to labor 
and employment laws by Grenier (1982), Chang and Ehrlich 
(1985), Lott and Roberts (1995), Weil (2005), and Hallett 
(2018), among others. 
 10. I focus only on the explicit penalties imposed by the legal 
system. While reputational costs also matter for some firms’ 
compliance decisions (Ji and Weil 2015; Johnson 2020), one 
cannot rely only on reputational costs to ensure compliance: if 
so, workers at the companies that do not face reputational costs 
may suffer from underpayment, and companies that would face 
reputational costs from noncompliance may simply be undercut 
by those that would not.
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